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Aaron M. Feeney
1 Introduction
The concept of time travel has been analyzed in philosophical literature for more
than sixty years,1 for obvious reasons, while time viewing seems to have eluded
direct attention.2 However, time viewing offers a similarly challenging range of
∗The text of this reformatted version is identical to the original April 6th, 2014 text, except
‘outcome-informative’ has replaced a former term with the same function and a clarifying
comment which starts, “i.e., definite information from...,” has been added to the third section.
1The most notable early philosophical works include the following: Williams, D. C., “The
Myth of Passage,” The Journal of Philosophy, 48 (1951): 457-472. Putnam, H., “It Ain’t
Necessarily So,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 22, American Philosophical As-
sociation Eastern Division: Symposium Papers to be Presented at the Fifty-Ninth Annual
Meeting, New York City, December 27-29, 1962 (1962), 658-671. Smart, J. J. C., “Is Time
Travel Possible?” The Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1963): 237-241. Swinburne, R. G., “Affecting
the Past,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1966): 341-347. Earman, J., “Going Backward
in Time,” Philosophy of Science, 34 (1967): 211-222. Berger, G., “The Conceptual Possibil-
ity of Time Travel,” The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 19 (1968): 152-155.
Harrison, J., “The Inaugural Address: Dr. Who and the Philosophers or Time-Travel for
Beginners,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 45 (1971):
1-24. Weingard, R., “On Travelling Backward in Time,” Synthese, Vol. 24, No 1/2, Space,
Time, and Geometry (1972): 117-132. Meiland, J. W., “A Two-Dimensional Passage Model
of Time for Time Travel,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy
in the Analytic Tradition, 26 (1974): 153-173. Horwich, P., “On Some Alleged Paradoxes
of Time Travel,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 14, Time, Cause, and Evidence
(1975): 432-444. Dwyer, L., “Time Travel and Changing the Past,” Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27 (1975): 341-350. Thom,
P., “Time-Travel and Non-Fatal Suicide,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27 (1975): 211-216. Lewis, D., “The Paradoxes of Time
Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976): 145-152. Dwyer, L. “How to affect, but
not change, the past,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 15 (1977): 383-385. Weingard,
R., “General Relativity and the Conceivability of Time Travel,” Philosophy of Science, 46
(1979): 328-332.
2Time viewers will here be defined as systems which are able to receive images of past
or future scenes and convey them to our eyes, or in the case of eyes, to our optic nerves.
Conceptually, at least, time viewers come in three main varieties which will be introduced in
the text: line-of-sight past viewers, chronovisors, and future viewers. Philosophical writings
devoted to chronovisors and future viewers, prior to the present work, seem to be absent from
the literature. However, related concepts raised in analyses of human precognitive abilities
and the possibility of backward causation have been extensively discussed. The following
references provide an overview of these topics: Dunne, J. W., An Experiment with Time,
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potential contradictions which call for resolution, in the context of future view-
ing. The central question of time travel concerns whether use of a time machine
could cause paradoxical changes to the past, or not. A rich atmosphere of in-
terdisciplinary efforts has recently culminated in a definite answer: Physicists
and engineers have developed a model of pastward time travel which elegantly
explains why anyone who succeeds to travel to the past in the manner permitted
within general relativity could not change it in any way.3 The most relevant as-
pects of this groundbreaking result, and the quantum teleportation experiments
which support it, are detailed here. On the other hand, the central problem of
time viewing is to understand how logical possibility would define the effects and
2nd edition (London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1929). Broad, C. D., “Mr. Dunne’s Theory of
Time in ‘An Experiment with Time,’ ” Philosophy, 10 (1935): 168-185. Broad, C. D., “The
Philosophical Implications of Foreknowledge,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Sup-
plementary Volumes, Vol. XVI, ‘Knowledge and Foreknowledge’ (1937): 177-209. Price, H.
H., “The Philosophical Implications of Precognition,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-
ety, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. XVI, ‘Knowledge and Foreknowledge’ (1937): 211-228.
Price, H. H., “Some Philosophical Questions about Telepathy and Clairvoyance,” Philosophy,
15 (1940): 363-385. Broad, C. D., “The Experimental Establishment of Telepathic Precog-
nition,” Philosophy, 19 (1944): 261-265. Mundle, C. W. K., “Professor Rhine’s Views about
PK,” Mind, 59 (1950): 372-379. Williams, D. C., “The Myth of Passage,” The Journal of Phi-
losophy, 48 (1951): 457-472. Dummet, A. E., Flew, A., “Symposium: Can an Effect Precede
Its Cause?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 28 (1954):
27-62. Smart, J. J. C., “The Temporal Asymmetry of the World,” Analysis, 14 (1954): 79-83.
Flew, A., “Effects Before Their Causes?: Addenda and Corrigenda” Analysis, 16 (1956): 104-
110. Scriven, M., “Modern Experiments in Telepathy,” The Philosophical Review, 65 (1956):
231-253. Black, M., “Why Cannot an Effect Precede Its Cause?” Analysis, 16 (1956): 49-58.
Flew, A., “Causal Disorder Again,” Analysis, 17 (1957): 81-86. Pears, D. F., “The Priority
of Causes,” Analysis, 17 (1957): 54-63. Chisholm, R., Taylor, R., “Making Things to Have
Happened,” Analysis, 20 (1960): 73-78. Robertson, L. C., “The Logical and Scientific Im-
plications of Precognition, Assuming This to Be Established Statistically from the Work of
Card-Guessing Subjects,” Philosophy, 36 (1961): 219-223. Dummet, M., “Bringing About the
Past,” The Philosophical Review, 73 (1964): 338-359. Gorovitz, S., “Leaving the Past Alone,”
The Philosophical Review, 73 (1964): 360-371. Mackie, J. L., “The Direction of Causation,”
The Philosophical Review, 75 (1966): 441-466. Meehl, P. E., “Precognitive Telepathy I: On
The Possibility of Distinguishing it Experimentally from Psychokinesis,” Noûs, 12 (1978):
235-266. Mundle, C. W. K., “Does the Concept of Precognition Make Sense?” Philosophy and
Parapsychology, (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1978). Anglin, W. S., “Backwards Causation,”
Analysis, 41 (1981): 86-91. Horwich, P., Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy
of Science, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987). Dowe, P., “Backward Causation and the Di-
rection of Causal Processes,” Mind, 105 (1996): 227-248. Price, H., “Backward Causation and
the Direction of Causal Processes: Reply to Dowe,” Mind, 105 (1996): 467-474. Ben-Yami,
H., “The Impossibility of Backwards Causation,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (2007): 439-
455. Roache, R., “Bilking the Bilking Argument,” Analysis, 69 (2009): 605-611. An extensive
philosophical literature pertaining to the implications of divine foreknowledge also exists, but
it is arguable that such works are not of sufficient relevance to be referenced here.
3Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S.,
Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed timelike curves via
postselection: theory and experimental demonstration,” arXiv :1005.2219v1 (2010): 5 pages.
Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., “Quantum mechan-
ics of time travel through post-selected teleportation,” Physical Review D, 84 (2010): 11
pages. Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S.,
Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed Timelike Curves via
Postselection: Theory and Experimental Test of Consistency,” Physical Review Letters, 106
(2011): 4 pages.
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maximum predictive capabilities of future-viewing machines. After some pre-
liminary concepts have been presented, the unique operational characteristics of
outcome-informative future-viewing machines will be explored. An overview of
related conceptual developments concerning time travel will then be provided.
Once this background is in place, a conceptual framework which resolves all
known time travel and time viewing confusions will be presented. Finally, a
number of surprising and highly desirable implications of outcome-informative
future-viewing machines will be shared for the first time.
It should be clarified at the outset that time viewing is commonplace. Since
time is always required for light to reach any lens from any scene, all functioning
optical systems are time viewers. More specifically, eyes, cameras, microscopes,
and telescopes are line-of-sight past viewers. So, there can be no doubt that
time viewers exist. Since line-of-sight past viewers are ubiquitous and very well-
understood, it is apparent that the main conceptual intrigue to be found in the
context of time viewing involves the contemplation of future-viewing systems.
In this overall context, what does it mean that time viewing and time travel are
reversed with respect to one another, whereby all the most troublesome aspects
of time travel involve travel to the past and all the most troublesome aspects
of time viewing involve viewing the future? This will turn out to be a pivotal
question in the conceptual unification of time travel and time viewing.
Of course, it is reasonable to wonder whether future-viewing machines are
even physically possible. Could a future-viewing machine ever actually be built?
While a few of the referenced papers implicitly suggest a possible physical basis
for just such a capability, an answer to this question will not be sought; instead,
the present work will focus on the conceptual and logical issues which attend
the assessment of such a technology, considered hypothetically.
2 Types of Future-Viewing Machines
A highly relevant concept, which has been familiar in all cultures throughout
human history, is that of individuals who are somehow able to perceive future
events. A notable example of this concept is found in ancient Greek mythol-
ogy. Princess Cassandra, daughter of the last king of Troy, was so beautiful
that even the god Apollo took notice. He offered her the power to know the
future perfectly, on an understanding that she would then willingly share his
bed. However, once having gained this ability, she decided to back out of the
arrangement. In retribution, Apollo decreed that no one would ever believe
her visions. The stage had thus been set for a powerful tragedy, for although
Cassandra would later foresee the fall of her kingdom, she could not enlist any
help to prevent it.4
The concept of such an ability is also encountered outside of mythology.
However, the possibility that human minds may be capable of accessing infor-
mation from the future is a problematic and murky subject that will not be
4Aeschylus, Agammenon, translated by E. D. A. Morshead, The Harvard Classics, Vol.
VIII, Part 1 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1909).
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approached here—the primary focus throughout will be upon technologically-
assisted future viewing. As such, the term future viewer will refer only to the
concept of a future-viewing machine. A person who directs and monitors a
future viewer will be referred to as its operator.
Many types of future viewers are conceivable, but various considerations lead
to a unique device of interest. To understand the basics about future viewers
in general, note that information about future outcomes can be either definite
and correct, definite and incorrect, ambiguous and correct, or ambiguous and
incorrect. Three ideas are relatively obvious, namely, that definite and correct
information is the most outcome-informative kind, that ambiguous information
can still be somewhat informative, as long as it is not too ambiguous, and that
incorrect information of any type is never informative. To illustrate the meaning
of ambiguous information, consider an assertion that one of three horses will win
a race involving ten horses. If one of the three selected horses wins, such an
assertion would provide an example of ambiguous and correct information which
would have been somewhat informative. However, if one of the other seven
horses were to win instead, the same ambiguous assertion would be incorrect
and, as a result, would not have been informative. Now consider the assertion
that one of ten horses will win a race involving ten horses. Assuming there
will be a finisher, this maximally ambiguous assertion is correct. However,
such information would be useless to anyone who might seek to gain a betting
advantage. In sum, definite information about future outcomes can be either
correct or incorrect, and ambiguous information about future outcomes can
be correct, incorrect, or technically correct but too ambiguous to be outcome-
informative.
One conceivable type of future viewer would enable its operator to see all
the different ways the future could turn out (i.e., all future timelines), while
being unable to reveal which timeline will be the actual future. For instance,
such a machine might show all ten horses winning the race, and all ten jockeys
falling off their horses, and the race being canceled, et cetera. Obviously, such a
future viewer could only supply information that would be too ambiguous to be
outcome-informative. However, for an operator who merely wishes to become
informed about what future outcomes are possible, such a device would be ideal.
This type of future viewer will be called an Everett machine.5
At the other extreme, one might try to imagine a future viewer which al-
5A major theme in popular accounts of modern physics involves how to deal with the
multiple possibilities which arise in quantum mechanics (i.e., the many solutions of a given
wavefunction). How should we interpret the reality underlying quantum mechanics? In 1957,
Hugh Everett III proposed what he referred to as the relative state interpretation to answer
this question. In the 1970s, Everett’s view was popularized under the name “the many-
worlds interpretation.” In more recent decades, it has simply been referred to as the Everett
interpretation. Apart from whether it is correct or incorrect, Everett’s view holds that every
quantum possibility is an actuality somewhere in a multiverse of rampant quantum bifurcation.
As a result, it is natural to refer to a class of future-viewing machines able to survey every
future possibility, but which cannot reveal what will happen, as Everett machines. In this
context, it should be stressed that none of the results of this paper depend upon any given
interpretation of quantum mechanics being correct or incorrect. Everett, H., III, “ ‘Relative
State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 29 (1957): 454-462.
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ways reveals, in every circumstance, definite and correct information about all
future outcomes. Such devices will be referred to as Cassandra machines, after
Cassandra’s mythical ability.
A Cassandra machine might initially seem to be a desirable type of future
viewer, until one considers what would happen if its operator were to ever dislike
the future it shows. If there really were a future-viewing machine which would
always, in every circumstance, provide definite and correct information about
future outcomes, then its operator would not be able to circumvent any outcome
it reveals. Such absolute rigidity is the unmistakable signature of Cassandra
machines, and a feature of these imaginary devices which can be exploited to
prove that they are not logically possible.
Dramatic examples involving foreknowledge of seemingly easily-preventable
fates, which nevertheless cannot be avoided at any cost, begin to suggest that
the concept of a Cassandra machine might be logically problematic. However
suggestive such scenarios might be, definite information about Cassandra ma-
chines is not likely to emerge from thought experiments involving human beings;
we are so unmanageably mysterious and complex, far more than any time ma-
chine or future-viewing machine could ever be. As a result, thought experiments
which do not involve human operators are preferable for reaching informative
conclusions. Such an exercise will be presented in the next section.
Now, since an Everett machine would show all possible outcomes, it is
clear that only impossible outcomes could contradict whatever an Everett ma-
chine might show. Of course, impossible outcomes cannot occur. As a result,
no scenario involving the use of an Everett machine could lead to a viewer-
contradicting outcome, ensuring that Everett machines are logically possible.
In contrast, as will soon be established, a Cassandra machine is not a logically
possible type of future viewer. Since Cassandra machines are defined as devices
which are always able to supply definite and correct information about every
future outcome, regardless of circumstance, it is relatively straightforward to
establish that no machine could fit such a description. This is achieved be-
low simply by illustrating a circumstance wherein it would be impossible for
any relevant instance of definite information about a future outcome to also be
correct.
Cassandra machines would be truly nightmarish contraptions, so it is a for-
tunate fact that they are not logically possible. After the impossibility of Cas-
sandra machines has been shown, a third type of future viewer is explained.
This third type of future viewer would be able to provide definite and correct
information about future outcomes under a wide range of circumstances, in the
mode of a Cassandra machine, yet would automatically operate as an Everett
machine (or not operate at all) whenever utilized in a circumstance that would
land a pure Cassandra machine in logical hot water.
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3 A Future-Viewing Thought Experiment
Imagine a computer that has mechanical control of a pointer which is able to
assume 360 discrete positions against a labeled backplate. This non-networked
computer is programmed to retrieve the stored output of a future-viewing ma-
chine which has been tuned to detect the future position of the same pointer,
twenty seconds hence. The future viewer, the memory unit, the computer, and
the mechanized pointer assembly are locked together in a secure room, under
a timed lock, to ensure that the computer has sole agency over the pointer
position during each run of the following experiment.
The computer will carry out various programs which specify how it is to
adjust the angle of the pointer, based what it retrieves from the memory unit.
Three times, tA, tB, and tC, are ten seconds apart and in alphabetical sequence.
The general experimental steps are defined as follows:
tA: At tA, the tC pointer angle is future-viewed. The result is
stored in the memory unit as some value x, which will be retrieved by
the computer once it has been activated at tB. In cases of ambiguous
information, x may be a conjunction of multiple values (e.g., x = 1°
& 91° & 181° & 271°).
tB: At tB, the computer is activated. It first retrieves x from
the memory unit to use as input for the program to be run in that
trial. The program will halt within three seconds, immediately after
completion of any adjustment, if any, to the pointer angle.
tC: The state of the pointer at tC is what the tA-stationed viewer
makes an attempt to view.
Within this sequence, any of the following programs may be run:
(P-0) At tA, if the future-viewed tC pointer angle is recorded as
x, then at tB, adjust the pointer to x + 0° and halt.
(P-1) At tA, if the future-viewed tC pointer angle is recorded as
x, then at tB, adjust the pointer to x + 1° and halt.
(P-2) At tA, if the future- viewed tC pointer angle is recorded as
x, then at tB, adjust the pointer to x + 2° and halt.
. . .
(P-359) At tA, if the future-viewed tC pointer angle is recorded
as x, then at tB, adjust the pointer to x + 359° and halt.
Of course, P-360 would be equivalent to P-0, and there would also be no reason
to include P-361, since it would be equivalent to P-1, and so forth. Thus,
programs P-0 through P-359 are sufficient to bring about all possible integer
degree adjustments to the pointer, given x as input.
Now, execution of P-0 obviously could not lead to a viewer-contradicting
outcome (VCO), i.e., an outcome which would show that the future viewer had
been incorrect. P-1 is where the logical puzzles begin. Assuming a pointer angle
of 11° at the beginning of an experimental run involving P-1, what value will
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the future viewer record in the memory unit? Of course, this is a trick question:
If the future viewer were to record x = 11°, then the computer would adjust
the pointer to 12° before halting, delivering a VCO. If the future viewer were to
record x = 12°, P-1 would deliver another VCO, for the pointer would end up at
13°. In general, if the viewer records any definite value x as the tC pointer angle,
then P-1 will adjust the pointer to rest on x + 1°, and a VCO will result. Of
course, this means that no definite value of x could be correct with respect to the
actual tC pointer angle, since every possible definite value of x leads to a VCO.
In other words, this particular setup with P-1 illustrates a “circumstance wherein
it would be impossible for any relevant instance of definite information about a
future outcome to also be correct.” So, a Cassandra machine cannot exist, since
the possibility of arranging even one such circumstance means that the definition
of a Cassandra machine cannot be fulfilled by any machine whatsoever.
It has already been shown how a future viewer which presents sufficiently
ambiguous information about the future can always operate in a manner which
will not result in a VCO; Everett machines automatically operate in such a
fashion, as they are maximally ambiguous. With the above result, it is now
evident that information about future outcomes from any future viewer what-
soever must become at least somewhat ambiguous within some situations, or a
VCO will result. It is vital to recognize that, if a VCO can ever result from
the use of a given future-viewing technology, then a machine based on such
a technology could potentially give incorrect or misleading information about
future outcomes. However, a technology that might ever provide incorrect or
misleading information about future outcomes could not qualify as a outcome-
informative technology.
A outcome-informative future viewer will be defined as a future viewer that
is able to operate in an outcome-informative mode (unlike an Everett machine),
which cannot give incorrect or misleading information, and which is logically
possible (unlike a Cassandra machine). This third requirement is essential
because a machine which cannot exist could not be useful for any purpose.
outcome-informative future viewers are therefore fully distinguishable from both
Everett machines and Cassandra machines. Such devices will here be termed
foreknowledge machines.
Engineers and physicists would additionally wish to understand the physi-
cal principles which ensure that a properly designed and manufactured future-
viewing machine based on a given future-viewing technology could not system-
atically provide incorrect or misleading information, i.e., definite information
from a foreknowledge machine that nevertheless leads to a VCO, in much the
same way that the principles of optics allow biologists and astronomers to trust
information from properly designed and manufactured microscopes and tele-
scopes.6 The development of such a theoretical understanding in the context of
6While scenes depicted in images can themselves be misleading (e.g., if disguise or camou-
flage has been used), that is a separate consideration. Many intervening optical effects may
also play a role in the formation of an image, for instance, those which arise from heated air,
great distance, interstellar gas and debris, fog, atmospheric effects, and lens flare—but these
are separate considerations as well. Optics provides a theoretical basis for accepting that
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future viewing would be central in the process of confirming that a genuine fore-
knowledge machine technology has been discovered. To assist the exposition,
instances of definite and correct information about future outcomes received by
future viewers will be referred to as viewer foreknowledge.
With any future-viewing machine technology, circumstances wherein only
ambiguity or non-operation could allow correctness to be maintained, or at
least allow a track record of correctness to be sustained, occur whenever it is
not logically possible for information from a future viewer to be both definite and
correct, e.g., during runs of P-1 through P-359. These scenarios will be referred
to as interference viewing scenarios. Logical problems with definite information
about future outcomes arise only within interference viewing scenarios. It is
clear that there would be no similar logical limitation on either the definite-
ness or accuracy of information that could be gained in what will be termed
non-interference viewing scenarios, scenarios wherein information pertaining to
time-viewed outcomes will not (or could not) be used to try to alter those
outcomes. Non-interference viewing scenarios must also include special cases
wherein an individual or organization, once having received viewer foreknowl-
edge pertaining to given future outcomes, will eventually help to bring those
outcomes to fruition. No logical principle would prevent a future viewer from
accessing viewer foreknowledge within any non-interference scenario, whereas
interference viewing scenarios with respect to any given set of future outcomes
could only yield ambiguous information about them, if any at all.
4 Non-Interference Viewing Scenarios and the
Second-time-around Fallacy
One may surmise that all the contingencies of a given program, which may
or may not cause an interference viewing scenario, have a direct effect on the
minimum level of ambiguity that a future viewer will display to avoid a VCO.
For example, the minimum level of ambiguity to avoid a VCO for P-1 and P-359
is 360 pointer positions, for P-90 and P-270 it is four pointer positions, and for
P-180 it is two pointer positions. Of course, no ambiguity is required to avoid a
VCO when running P-0, so in that case, viewer foreknowledge of the tC pointer
angle would be accessible to the future-viewing machine within the locked room.
Now, imagine there is also a future-viewing machine in the next room, which
may be used to observe the outcome of the experiment, but which does not pass
its output to the computer. This second viewer has thus not been forced into
an interference viewing scenario, so it will always provide viewer foreknowledge
of the outcome of every experiment, regardless of which program is run.
Foreknowledge machines will provide viewer foreknowledge within all non-
interference viewing scenarios. More generally, every type of time viewer will
properly functioning optical instruments will not provide incorrect or misleading information,
because no detail in an optically-received image can correspond to something that was not in
the scene and was not the result of an intervening effect.
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access definite and correct information in all non-interference viewing scenarios.
This generalized principle will be called the principle of non-interference. There
are many applications of this principle. Naturally, its opposite, the principle
of interference, states that no time viewer of any type will be able to access
definite and correct information when it has been forced into an interference
viewing scenario.
What are some of the applications of these principles? To begin to explore
this topic, an important insight from philosophical literature about time travel
is helpful: Any given events on a timeline happen only once, and not even a
time traveler can alter them. Essentially, whatever happened, happened, either
with or without the participation of time travelers. Failing to grasp this and
imagining instead that a series of events in the past could initially occur without
time travelers, and then would somehow occur again, but with a science-fiction
twist, if time travelers ever decide to visit, is known among philosophers as the
“second-time-around fallacy.”7 This term was coined by Nicholas J. Smith more
than two decades after it was so compellingly described by Larry Dwyer:
If we hypothesize that T pulls levers and manipulates a rocket in
1974, and travels back in time to the year 3000 B.C. then of course,
even before T enters his rocket, it is true that any accurate catalogue
of all the events on earth during the year 3000 B.C. would include
an account of T ’s actions, reactions and mental processes. There is
no question of the year 3000 B.C. occurring more than once.8
Three years later, David Lewis also described the second-time-around fallacy in
his classic 1976 paper, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel.” Here is his description,
presented in terms of a time travel puzzle that needs no introduction, the so-
called grandfather paradox:
We may be tempted to speak of the “original” 1921 that lies in
Tim’s personal past, many years before his birth, in which Grand-
father lived; and of the “new” 1921 in which Tim now finds himself
waiting in ambush to kill Grandfather. But if we do speak so, we
merely confer two names on one thing.9
7Smith, N. J. J., “Bananas Enough for Time Travel?” British Journal of the Philosophy of
Science, 48 (1997): 363-389.
8Dwyer, L., “Time Travel and Changing the Past,” Philosophical Studies: An International
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27 (1975): 341-350.
9Lewis, D., “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976):
145-152. In this context, science-fiction author, Larry Niven, presented a most delightfully
paradoxical version of the grandfather paradox in his 1971 essay, “The Theory and Practice
of Time Travel.” “The Grandfather Paradox is basic to any discussion of time travel. It
runs as follows: At the age of eighty your grandfather invents a time machine. You hate the
old man, so you steal the machine and take it sixty years back into the past and kill him. How
can they suspect you? But you’ve killed him before he can meet your grandmother. Thus
you were never born. He didn’t get a chance to build the time machine either. But then you
can’t have killed him. Thus he may sire your father, who may sire you. Later there will be a
time machine..." Niven also poetically quipped: “With a Grandfather Paradox operating, the
effect, coming before the cause, may cause the cause never to come into effect, with results
9
The past cannot be altered or reset, so no logical reason could prevent any
instance of past viewing from taking the form of definite and correct informa-
tion. In other words, past viewing is always automatically conducted within
non-interference viewing scenarios; there is no way to force a past viewer into
an interference viewing scenario. As will soon be established, this would hold
even if time travel were available. Since past viewing is the only way we see
anything, then even if the world were filled with time travel, it would never
become ephemeral and uncertain. As opposed to so many confused (although
admittedly entertaining) cinematic treatments, pastward time travel could never
cause people to slowly disappear or make photographs of relatives fade away.
Recognizing that the past cannot be changed goes hand-in-hand with the notion
that it is impossible to cause any sort of a paradox with time travel, a conclusion
that will be fully established in the next section.
So, it should be clear that a time traveler cannot change anything in the
past—even to the extent of disturbing a single 1921 electron. Time travelers
can only participate in past events, just as they happened, if the manner in
which they happened involved the participation of time travelers. This also
applies to the kind of role we play in present and future events; all times are
equivalent in this respect. On this topic, Lewis provided the following insightful
observation:
You cannot change a present or future event from what it was
originally to what it is after you change it. What you can do is
to change the present or the future from the unactualized way they
would have been without some action of yours to the way they actu-
ally are. But that is not an actual change: not a difference between
two successive actualities.10
Past outcomes are fixed; no technology could bring about “a difference between
two successive actualities” in order to change past outcomes.11 As a result,
which are not even self-consistent.” Niven, L., “The Theory and Practice of Time Travel,” All
the Myriad Ways, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975).
10Lewis, D., “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976):
145-152.
11One might interpret current retrocausal quantum signaling experiments, if successful, to
represent a challenge to the point made in the text. While such experimental efforts seek to
demonstrate a later cause having an earlier effect, usually due to quantum entanglement be-
tween non-delayed photons and photons delayed via miles of fiber-optic cable, they certainly
could not involve “a difference between two successive actualities.” If such experiments prove
successful, they would only serve to support the point being made in the text; they would
show the causal participation of a future (or present) event in a present (or past) outcome.
Scientists have long considered retrocausality to be a legitimate physical possibility which
might also be an essential feature of physical laws. Feynman, R., Wheeler, J. A., “Interaction
with the Absorber as the Mechanism of Radiation,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 17 (1945):
157-181. Feynman, R., Wheeler, J. A., “Classical Electrodynamics in Terms of Direct In-
terparticle Action,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 21 (1949): 425-433. Cramer, J. G., “The
Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 58 (1986):
647-687. Cramer, J. G., “An Overview of the Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Me-
chanics,” International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 27 (1988): 227-236. Dobyns, Y. H.,
“Retrocausation, Consistency, and the Bilking Paradox,” AIP Conf. Proc., 1408 (2011): 235-
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all past viewers must operate exclusively in non-interference viewing scenarios.
Soon, after more conceptual background has been presented, an effort will be
made to force a line-of-sight past viewer into an interference viewing scenario.
However, the understanding to be gained next will serve to show that this cannot
be achieved.
5 QuantumMechanics Associated with Pastward
Time Travel and Future Viewers
In an exploration of the manner in which time travel paradoxes may be elim-
inated, a pursuit which also reveals many insights related to the behavior of
foreknowledge machines, it is useful to begin by mentioning the Novikov self-
consistency principle, named after the Russian physicist Igor Novikov. This
principle was expressed in the 1990 paper, “Cauchy problem in spacetimes with
closed time-like curves,”12 by Novikov and physicists John Friedman, Michael
Morris, Fernando Echeverria, Gunnar Klinkhammer, Kip Thorne, and Ulvi
Yurtsever. Closed timelike curves (CTCs) are efficiently described as, “tra-
jectories in spacetime that effectively travel backwards in time: a test particle
following a CTC can in principle interact with its former self in the past.”13
The self-consistency principle bears Novikov’s name because he advanced it
well over a decade earlier at physics conferences and in a Russian book he co-
authored with Yakov Zel’dovich.14 The following quotation from the 1990 paper,
with its original italics, provides its final formulation as well as information
about Novikov’s initial conceptual motivation:
Some years ago... Novikov... briefly considered the possibility
that... [CTCs] might exist and argued that they cannot entail this
type of causality violation... [i.e., changes to the past]: Events on a
CTC are already guaranteed to be self-consistent, Novikov argued;
they influence each other around the closed curve in a self-adjusted,
cyclical, self-consistent way. The other authors recently have arrived
at the same viewpoint.
254. Radin, D. I., “Predicting the Unpredictable: 75 Years of Experimental Evidence,” AIP
Conf. Proc., 1408 (2011): 204-217.
12Echeverria, F., Friedman, J., Klinkhammer, G., Morris, M. S., Novikov, I. D., Thorne,
K. S., Yurtsever, U., “Cauchy problem in spacetimes with closed timelike curves,” Physical
Review D, 42 (1990): 1915-1930.
13Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S.,
Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed timelike curves via
postselection: theory and experimental demonstration,” arXiv :1005.2219v1 (2010): 5 pages.
14Novikov, I. D., Zel’dovich, Y. B., Stroeniye i Evolyutsia Vselennoi (Moscow: Nauka,
1975). The endnote in “Cauchy problem in spacetimes with closed timelike curves,” which
contains the above reference includes the following curious comment which reveals a certain
political sensitivity surrounding the physics of CTCs in the early ’80s: “Note that in the
English edition of the latter reference [Relativistic Astrophysics, Vol. 2, The Structure and
Evolution of the Universe (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983), bottom of page 637
and top of page 638] the text was changed without Novikov’s agreement to say that CTC’s
cannot occur.”
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We shall embody this viewpoint in a principle of self-consistency,
which states that the only solutions to the laws of physics that can
occur locally in the real Universe are those which are globally self-
consistent. This principle allows one to build a local solution to the
equations of physics only if that local solution can be extended to
be part of a (not necessarily unique) global solution...15
In this context, ‘global’ refers to all of space and time. The term CTC has been
familiar to physicists since Kurt Gödel’s famous 1949 time travel result. Gödel’s
paper proved that CTCs which would enable travel to the past automatically
emerge within solutions of the equations of general relativity, as long as one
posits a rotating universe. Nearly sixty-five years ago, Gödel was able to math-
ematically establish that, “it is theoretically possible in these worlds to travel
into the past, or otherwise influence the past.”16 While there is no evidence that
our universe is rotating, the conceptual cat had nevertheless been let out of the
bag—theorists have understood for two generations that pastward time travel
is compatible with general relativity.
Disregarding Novikov’s self-consistency principle, one may still idly imagine
a person going back in time to break the chain of his or her own lineage to
bring about a dreaded time travel paradox. However, in reality, the idea that it
might ever be possible to rearrange natural phenomena in any way that could
“trick” nature into an actual paradox is absurd. No serious thinker believes
genuine physical paradoxes are at all possible, either via pastward time travel
or by any other means. Accordingly, many have concluded that pastward time
travel must not be possible, on the assumption that such a form of travel could
allow paradoxes to be set up. However, the conclusion, “if nature were to allow
pastward time travel at all, then paradoxes could be set up,” does not follow
from a series of stories which can only serve to establish that one may choose to
imagine, among other choices, that pastward time travel could lead to paradoxes.
A physical mechanism that would make it impossible for anyone to embark on
time trips which would lead to paradox, but which would also allow consistent
time trips to proceed, would rule out any possibility of paradox without ruling
out pastward time travel. In order to accept that opening and traversing a CTC
to the past may be a genuine technological possibility, it is necessary to believe
that such a mechanism may exist. So, ultimately, efforts to discover principles
which might constitute such a mechanism are an aid to understanding whether
pastward time travel may really be possible.
However, there is potentially a much more direct way to evaluate its possi-
bility. An inventor would not have to concern himself with questions of paradox
at all; a single journey to the past would settle the matter entirely. Since para-
doxes are every bit as impossible as round squares, there is no reason for an
inventor to worry about the potential of causing them.
15Echeverria, F., Friedman, J., Klinkhammer, G., Morris, M. S., Novikov, I. D., Thorne,
K. S., Yurtsever, U., “Cauchy problem in spacetimes with closed timelike curves,” Physical
Review D, 42 (1990): 1915-1930.
16Gödel, K., “An Example of a New Type of Cosmological Solutions of Einstein’s Field
Equations of Gravitation,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 21 (1949): 447-450.
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So, if there are any time travelers who know much about us, they surely de-
rive amusement from the quaint 20th-century misconception, which still holds
sway in our century, that traveling to the past might ever cause some kind of
paradox. For people of our era who have never seen a time machine, how-
ever, a question mark still looms over whether pastward time travel can ever
be accomplished, so a proof which assures us that it could not lead to paradox
would be very helpful indeed, and would embolden inventors to press forward
(or pastward, as the case may be). The search for such a proof and its atten-
dant concepts was arguably initiated by science fiction writers, then was greatly
advanced by philosophers, and finally, for all intents and purposes, has recently
been ended by physicists.17
The many papers referenced in the first endnote represent the most no-
table examples from the first twenty-eight years of philosophical writings on
time travel. In the earliest of these works, attempts were made to argue that
time travel is not logically possible, due to various supposed inconsistencies and
paradoxes.18 The field then began to lean toward the opposite viewpoint. With
17In order to trace, as far back as possible, the search for a proof that time travel cannot
lead to paradoxes, one must begin by reading early science fiction. While many stories allow
paradoxes to occur for dramatic effect, other works invented mysterious or ironic ways that
nature would respond in order to avoid or repair them. To reveal specifics could potentially
spoil hours of fun. Nahin, P. J., Time Machines: Time Travel in Physics, Metaphysics and
Science Fiction (New York: Springer-Verlag and AIP Press, 1999). Also see Niven’s insightful
essay on time travel geared toward the science-fiction author: Niven, L., “The Theory and
Practice of Time Travel,” All the Myriad Ways, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975). As noted
throughout the paper, philosophers also eventually got into the act and made a great deal
of progress. Most notably, they identified the second-time-around fallacy. Berger, G., “The
Conceptual Possibility of Time Travel,” The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 19
(1968): 152-155. Dwyer, L., “Time Travel and Changing the Past,” Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27 (1975): 341-350. Thom,
P., “Time-Travel and Non-Fatal Suicide,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal
for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27 (1975): 211-216. Lewis, D., “The Paradoxes
of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976): 145-152. Dwyer, L. “How
to affect, but not change, the past,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 15 (1977): 383-
385. Casati, R., “That Useless Time Machine,” Philosophy, 76 (2001): 581-583. Goddu, G.
C., “A Useful Time Machine,” Philosophy, 77 (2002): 281-282. Finally, a team of physicists
recently established why time travel cannot lead to paradoxes. Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-
Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S., Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y.,
Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed timelike curves via postselection: theory and experimental
demonstration,” arXiv :1005.2219v1 (2010): 5 pages. Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron,
R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., “Quantum mechanics of time travel through post-selected
teleportation,” Physical Review D, 84 (2010): 11 pages. Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron,
R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S., Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm,
L., Steinberg, A., “Closed Timelike Curves via Postselection: Theory and Experimental Test
of Consistency,” Physical Review Letters, 106 (2011): 4 pages.
18Donald Williams’ often-cited article argues against the conceptual possibility of time
travel. Williams, D. C., “The Myth of Passage,” The Journal of Philosophy, 48 (1951): 457-
472. Fred Dretske’s 1962 article also raises issues regarding its conceptual possibility. Dretske,
F. I., “Moving Backward in Time,” The Philosophical Review, 71 (1962): 94-98. While Hilary
Putnam argued in favor of its conceptual possibility in his 1962 article, “It Ain’t Necessarily
So,” he also tantalizingly remarked that, “[i]n the last few years I have been amused and
irritated by the spate of articles proving that time travel is a ‘conceptual impossibility.’ ”
Unfortunately, he did not cite any member of that spate. While it is unclear which articles
Putnam had in mind, he may have been thinking of some of the earlier works cited in the
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difficult questions as to its physical possibility set off to the side, philosophers
began pointing out that the conceivability of consistent forms of pastward time
travel at least establishes that it is a logical possibility.19
From that moment in the history of conceptual development forward, philoso-
phers began discussing the imagined implications of assuming that time travel
is physically possible and yet cannot be used to produce paradoxes. The con-
tributions of these later papers fall into at least two broad categories. First and
foremost, the nature of self-consistent time travel received clarification. The
seminal papers which identified, established, and elaborated the second-time-
around fallacy fall under this classification.20 These contributions were very
important among the developments of the 1970s which have crystallized into
the present understanding.
Still other papers take the idea of an unalterable past for granted and at-
tempt to understand the full implications of this in the context of time travel.
However, as will be explained, many of these papers discuss the strange coinci-
dences that were mistakenly assumed would have to occur in order for nature
to be able to protect itself from our temporal manipulations.21 The current
second endnote which argue against the possibility of backward causation, as they may be
construed as implicitly arguing against the conceptual possibility of time travel. Putnam, H.,
“It Ain’t Necessarily So,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 22, American Philosophical
Association Eastern Division: Symposium Papers to be Presented at the Fifty-Ninth Annual
Meeting, New York City, December 27-29, 1962 (1962), 658-671.
19Mayo, B., “Objects, Events, and Complementarity,” The Philosophical Review, 70 (1961):
340-361. Putnam, H., “It Ain’t Necessarily So,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 22,
American Philosophical Association Eastern Division: Symposium Papers to be Presented
at the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting, New York City, December 27-29, 1962 (1962), 658-671.
Philosopher J. J. C. Smart concluded, “we can concede the conceptual possibility of time
travel.” Smart, J. J. C., “Is Time Travel Possible?” The Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1963):
237-241. Berger, G., “The Conceptual Possibility of Time Travel,” The British Journal of
the Philosophy of Science, 19 (1968): 152-155. Meiland, J. W., “A Two-Dimensional Pas-
sage Model of Time for Time Travel,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 26 (1974): 153-173. Horwich, P., “On Some Alleged
Paradoxes of Time Travel,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 14, Time, Cause, and
Evidence (1975): 432-444. Dwyer, L., “Time Travel and Changing the Past,” Philosophi-
cal Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27 (1975):
341-350. Lewis, D., “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13
(1976): 145-152. Weingard, R., “General Relativity and the Conceivability of Time Travel,”
Philosophy of Science, 46 (1979): 328-332.
20Berger, G., “The Conceptual Possibility of Time Travel,” The British Journal of the
Philosophy of Science, 19 (1968): 152-155. Dwyer, L., “Time Travel and Changing the Past,”
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27
(1975): 341-350. Thom, P., “Time-Travel and Non-Fatal Suicide,” Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27 (1975): 211-216. Lewis,
D., “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976): 145-152.
Dwyer, L. “How to affect, but not change, the past,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 15
(1977): 383-385. Casati, R., “That Useless Time Machine,” Philosophy, 76 (2001): 581-583.
Goddu, G. C., “A Useful Time Machine,” Philosophy, 77 (2002): 281-282.
21Earman, J., “Implications of Causal Propagation Outside the Null-Cone,” Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 50 (1972): 222-237. Lewis, D., “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,”
American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976): 145-152. Horwich, P., Asymmetries in Time:
Problems in the Philosophy of Science, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987). Maudlin, T.,
“Time-Travel and Topology,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of
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state-of-the-art thinking to be detailed soon, however, indicates that protective
coincidences would essentially be a non-issue in the context of actual pastward
time travel, if there is or will ever be such a context.
For instance, papers like “Bananas Enough for Time Travel?” accept the
second-time-around fallacy and go on to discuss the idea that coincidences might
prevent “bilking,” a term widely used by philosophers as a shorthand for would-
be paradoxical tomfoolery.22 Lewis identified coincidences, such as slipping on
a banana peel right before a bilking attempt, as a catch-all means whereby
bilking could be prevented, were pastward time travel ever practiced. Works
which discuss coincidences as a central consideration generally argue that the
inordinate number that would supposedly be required may permit the conclusion
that pastward time travel is not likely to be feasible, but cannot justify an
argument that it must be impossible.23
The latest viewpoint, however, shows that coincidences are not of any special
importance in the context of time travel. While apparent coincidences could
occur to prevent a bilking incident, just as rarely as they might occur to prevent
anything else, there is no reason to posit that coincidences would or must occur
with greater than normal frequency in spacetime regions around CTCs. Instead,
it is now understood that bilking would always automatically be prevented at
the source: Any attempt to open a CTC to the past which would have resulted
in bilking will be unsuccessful.24
Science Association, Vol. 1990, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1990): 303-315. Smith,
N. J. J., “Bananas Enough for Time Travel?” British Journal of the Philosophy of Science,
48 (1997): 363-389. Smith, N. J. J., “The problems of backward time travel,” Endeavor, 22
(1998): 156-158. Ismael, J., “Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument,” Synthese, 136
(2003): 305-320.
22Smith, N. J. J., “Bananas Enough for Time Travel?” British Journal of the Philosophy of
Science, 48 (1997): 363-389.
23Maudlin, T., “Time-Travel and Topology,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of
the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1990, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1990):
303-315. Smith, N. J. J., “Bananas Enough for Time Travel?” British Journal of the Phi-
losophy of Science, 48 (1997): 363-389. Sider, T., “Time Travel, Coincidences and Coun-
terfactuals,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, 110 (2002): 115-138. Ismael, J., “Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument,”
Synthese, 136 (2003): 305-320.
24Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S.,
Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed timelike curves via
postselection: theory and experimental demonstration,” arXiv :1005.2219v1 (2010): 5 pages.
Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., “Quantum mechan-
ics of time travel through post-selected teleportation,” Physical Review D, 84 (2010): 11
pages. Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola,
S., Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed Timelike Curves
via Postselection: Theory and Experimental Test of Consistency,” Physical Review Letters,
106 (2011): 4 pages. Here is what, “[a]ny attempt to open a CTC to the past which would
have resulted in bilking will be unsuccessful,” would mean for Tim’s wish to pay his grandfa-
ther a deadly visit. Let’s grant that a CTC opens to allow Tim to set foot in 1921. During
Tim’s visit, even if it were to appear that a coincidence has miraculously intervened in order
to prevent grand-patricide, such a happening would neither be miraculous nor coincidental.
Instead, such a happening had already served to allow the CTC to open, which would not
have otherwise opened. In all likelihood, however, since wayward banana peels and jammed
guns are so rare, it is overwhelmingly likely that Tim would simply be unable to open a CTC
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This is an astounding result which has revolutionized the understanding
of how pastward time travel can be kept logically consistent within a non-
bifurcating temporal ontology.25 To understand this result, a brief detour into
the work of Lloyd et al. will be required. Seth Lloyd, of MIT, is a leading
expert in quantum engineering and quantum information. His team explored a
possible analog of time travel within the framework of “postselected quantum
teleportation.”26 Quantum teleportation allows for quantum information to be
transferred from one quantum system and embodied in a receiving quantum
system. Their essential idea was to encode the logical features of a bilking at-
tempt into measurable quantities in a specially-designed experiment involving
postselected quantum teleportation, and then to observe what happens. This
innovation allowed them to physically simulate postselected CTCs (P-CTCs),
in order to experimentally explore whether nature would allow bilking within a
model of time travel based on P-CTCs. Here is their experiment, in their own
words:
We present an experiment to simulate how the grandfather para-
dox might develop in a P-CTC: the postselected results are indis-
tinguishable from what would happen when a photon is sent a few
billionths of a second back in time to try to “kill” its former self.27
For further insight into what they accomplished by proposing this theoretical
framework and obtaining the related experimental results, here are two addi-
tional quotations from the same article:
to 1921, until he has a change of heart. However, even if he were to eventually decide that he
only wants to see his grandfather from afar, the second-time-around fallacy would have the
final say: If Tim never took part in any of the happenings of 1921, it would simply be off
limits to him. Of course, this is all enforced by the fact that a CTC to 1921 will never open
for him to traverse. If he was never part of that year, a CTC to 1921 might open for others,
even in situations where Tim is standing close to the time portal platform, but a CTC to 1921
will never open in any circumstance which will lead to Tim traversing it.
25David Deutsch proposed in 1991, and in 1994 with Michael Lockwood, that time travel
could be kept logically consistent if the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics (a bifur-
cating temporal ontology) were true, for time travel would consist of travel to other universes.
John Abbruzzese discussed some problems he perceived with this model of time travel in a
short 2001 article. More decisively, in 2004, a physicist with an ironic last name, Allen Ev-
erett, calculated that wormhole time travel to other times within a multiverse context would
result in, “different pieces [of the unfortunate would-be time traveler] winding up in different
‘worlds.’ ” In his 2012 article on the same topic, Nikk Effingham explored whether multiverse
time travel would even count as time travel, and referred to Everett’s 2004 result as the “Slic-
ing Thesis.” Deutsch, D., “Quantum mechanics near closed timelike lines,” Physical Review D,
44 (1991): 3197-3217. Deutsch, D., Lockwood, M., “The Quantum Physics of Time Travel,”
Scientific American, 270 (1994): 68-74. Abbruzzese, J., “On using the multiverse to avoid the
paradoxes of time travel,” Analysis, 61 (2001): 36-38. Everett, A., “Time Travel Paradoxes,
Path Integrals, and the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,” Physical Re-
view D, 69 (2004): 35 pages. Effingham, N., “An Unwelcome Consequence of the Multiverse
Thesis,” Synthese, 184 (2012): 375-386.
26Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S.,
Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed Timelike Curves via
Postselection: Theory and Experimental Test of Consistency,” Physical Review Letters, 106
(2011): 4 pages.
27Ibid.
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The P-CTC... starts from two systems prepared in a maximally
entangled state |Ψ>..., and ends by projecting them into the same
state <Ψ|... Probabilities for events in the presence of a P-CTC
are obtained by using ordinary quantum mechanics to calculate the
conditional probabilities of the events given that a measurement on
the final part of the CTC yields the state |Ψ>. The probabilities for
events in a P-CTC thus depend on the past and the future.
If the probability for the outcome |Ψ> is zero, then the P-CTC
cannot occur: our mechanism embodies in a natural way the Novikov
principle... that only logically self-consistent events occur in the
universe....
These probe qubits measure the state of the polarization qubit
before and after the quantum gun is “fired.” When the postselection
succeeds (which simulates the time travel occurring), the state of the
qubits is measured. If they are equal (00 or 11) the gun has failed
to flip the polarization: the photon “survives,” otherwise (01 or 10)
the photon has “killed” its past self.
The state of the probe qubits, conditioned on the post-selection
succeeding, was measured for different values of θ... [from the rel-
evant diagram in the article, θ is the “Quantum Gun Angle”]. The
probes are never 01 or 10, which shows that “time travel cannot
happen” unless the gun misfires, leaving the polarization qubit un-
changed and the probes in 00 or 11. Namely, suicidal photons in
a CTC obey the Novikov principle: they cannot kill their former
selves.28
So, their P-CTC model automatically explains why bilking would be impossible.
Attempts to open a CTC into the past would not just depend on the techno-
logical capability of doing so, such attempts would also depend, on a case by
case basis, upon all of the resultant effects of doing so. Assuming a working
time machine, if a given attempt to open and traverse a CTC would have led to
bilking, that attempt will fail; a CTC will not open. On the other hand, using
the same time machine, if another attempt to open and traverse a CTC will not
lead to bilking, that CTC will open.
This makes sense within a postselected model of time travel, i.e., a “self-
adjusted, cyclical, self-consistent” model of time travel; the CTC to the past
defines the initial leg of a would-be cycle, and the fact that all the effects of a
given CTC-opening would already be present when the attempt to open that
CTC is made, defines the return leg. Only self-consistent cycles would be per-
mitted in the instantaneous postselection process which attends every attempt
to open a CTC, so even cases of unintentional bilking would be ruled out. An
easy way to encapsulate all of these ideas is to note that the personal future
of time travelers who are traveling into the past must already be part of the
past whenever they might attempt to begin their journey. This means that they
would not be able to do just anything on a trip to the past, they could only do
28Ibid.
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precisely what occurred in the past. So, in some sense, since every trip back
will have already happened by the time it is attempted, only those attempts to
take trips into the past that were successful will be successful. Trips that were
not taken, can never be taken, and trips that bilk could not have been taken,
so were not taken, and so can never be taken.
This cyclical view of time travel may seem, at first, like a sleight-of-hand
trick. However, consideration of time travel in terms of the insights supporting
the second-time-around fallacy lead directly to this same view.
An important question was posed in the introduction: What does it mean
that time viewing and time travel are reversed with respect to one another,
whereby all the most troublesome aspects of time travel involve travel to the
past and all the most troublesome aspects of time viewing involve viewing the
future? It turns out that time viewing is a special case of time travel, for
note that traveling back in time with information about the future could yield
the same information as viewing the future. The answer to this question is
that the “most troublesome aspects” of time travel and the “most troublesome
aspects” of time viewing, which initially appear separate, are actually the same.
This is clarified upon consideration of a cyclical view of future viewing. Viewer
foreknowledge can only occur when its reception cannot lead to a VCO, and
every attempt to view the future under an interference viewing scenario, at
most, could only yield ambiguous information, such as one would expect from
an Everett machine. So, anything that the logical coherence of events leading
to a given future demands that we must not know before those events transpire
will simply be off limits to us, both because time travelers will not be able to
bring such information back to us (or send it through a CTC), and also because,
in such cases, future-viewing machines will not be able to provide us with viewer
foreknowledge. So, essentially identical cyclical analyses serve to explain why
both time travel and time viewing are bilk-proof. This series of insights will be
referred to as view-travel unification.
A surprising application of view-travel unification provides the solution to
the following modified experiment which will pit the principle of non-interference
against the principle of interference in a most dramatic way. Telescopes are line-
of-sight past viewers, and the same is true of radio telescopes (i.e., parabolic
dish radio receivers). With this in mind, consider a new pointer position exper-
iment which initially appears to be equivalent to the original pointer position
experiment, in which a radio telescope will be used instead of a future viewer.
The procedure which makes this a seemingly equivalent experiment is that the
radio telescope and its corresponding memory unit will be attached to the com-
puter which controls the pointer assembly, and all of this equipment will be set
up within a time machine spaceship which will automatically take itself into the
past to give it enough time to travel through space to the transmission point one
year before, one light-year away. Assuming the spaceship is able to complete a
one light-year journey in ten years, the time machine aspect of the spaceship
will be programmed to bring the entire assembly a little more than eleven years
into the past; this gives it ample time to complete its long space journey toward
the transmission point. The time labels tA’, tB’, and tC’ will be used for this
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modified experiment—in this case arranged alphabetically in sequence with re-
spect to the “personal time” of the spaceship, rather than in terms of calendar
time, as before—which is to be carried out in the following manner:
tA’: At tA’, the tC’ pointer angle is received in a radio transmis-
sion which originated one light-year away. The result is stored in
the memory unit as value y, which will be retrieved by the computer
upon activation at tB’. In cases of ambiguous information, y may
be a conjunction of multiple values (e.g., x = 18° & 108° & 198° &
288°).
tB’: A short while after the spaceship has arrived at its desti-
nation, one light-year away from Sol, and has decelerated until its
relative velocity is null with respect to Sol (in order to ensure that
a distant evaluation of timing can be given a straightforward mean-
ing), the computer is activated precisely one year and ten seconds
(in terms of calendar time) before tA’, i.e., at tB’. Upon activa-
tion, the computer retrieves y from the memory unit, and a given
program is executed by the computer using y as input. The pro-
gram halts within three seconds, immediately after completion of
any adjustment to the pointer angle.
tC’: Ten seconds after tB’ the state of the pointer at tC’ is trans-
mitted to Sol for the tA’-stationed radio telescope within the consid-
erably “younger” version of the time machine spaceship to receive.
As above, many different programs may be specified:
(P-0’) At tA’, if the tC’ pointer angle is received as y, then at tB’,
adjust the pointer to y + 0° and halt. (P-1’)
At tA’, if the tC’ pointer angle is received as y, then at tB’, adjust
the pointer to y + 1° and halt. (P-2’)
At tA’, if the tC’ pointer angle is received as y, then at tB’, adjust
the pointer to y + 2° and halt.
. . .
(P-359’) At tA’, if the tC’ pointer angle is received as y, then at
tB’, adjust the pointer to y + 359° and halt.
This complicated description represents a case where a line-of-sight past viewer
can seemingly be made to stand in for a future viewer. If this truly could be
done, then the idea that all past-viewing occurs only within non-interference
viewing scenarios would have to be abandoned. At first it might appear that,
during a run of P-1’ through P-359’, the radio receiver would be forced into an
interference viewing scenario, in which case the principle of interference would
suggest that the only way a VCO could be avoided would be for the radio re-
ceiver to pick up ambiguous information about the outcome of the experiment.
As promised, the principle of interference will now be pit against the princi-
ple of non-interference. This is accomplished by imagining that an identically-
constructed radio telescope is positioned alongside the spaceship time machine
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at tA’. This second radio telescope, since it does not pass any information to
the computer within the time machine spaceship, would be in a non-interference
viewing scenario with respect to the outcome of the experiment. Thus, the prin-
ciple of non-interference indicates that this second radio telescope will receive
definite and correct information about the outcome of the experiment. As a re-
sult, if both principles are right, it seems that two identically-constructed radio
telescopes, which have been positioned side-by-side, would have to receive the
same signal differently. Such a phenomenon is surely impossible, so it initially
appears that this thought experiment may have uncovered a conceptual problem
with these principles. However, the postselected, self-adjusting, cyclical, self-
consistent model of pastward time travel at the basis of view-travel unification
means that a time machine cannot be used to make a line-of-sight past viewer
stand in for a future viewer in such an experiment, because a CTC will only
open up if the program to be run is P-0’. The entire false dilemma has thus been
sidestepped. A VCO cannot occur for line-of-sight past viewers, which indeed
operate exclusively in non-interference viewing scenarios.
Conceptually, at least, there is another variety of past viewer, the chrono-
visor.29 A chronovisor is a machine imagined to have the ability to display
any scene its operator selects from the past, i.e., a non-line-of-sight past viewer.
If all past viewers operate exclusively in non-interference viewing scenarios, a
properly functioning chronovisor should always be able to provide definite and
correct information about any of the past events its operator has adjusted the
chronovisor’s controls to receive. As in the radio telescope case, this must even
be true if the operator of a chronovisor were also able to employ time travel: If
she sees into the past with a chronovisor, she will either see herself attending
a given event by way of her time machine, or not. An imagined third possibil-
ity, wherein she does not see herself participating in the event “the first time
around,” and afterwards decides to use her time machine to participate in it
“the second time around,” is an absurdity which has already been dismissed.
More conceptual work, however, is required to establish that chronovisors al-
ways operate exclusively in non-interference viewing scenarios, even if pastward
29Krassa, P., Dein Schicksal ist vorherbestimmt: Pater Ernettis Zeitmaschine und das
Geheimnis der Akasha-Chronik (Herbig: München, 1997). Three years later, Krassa’s book
was translated from the original German. Krassa, P., Father Ernetti’s Chronovisor: The
Creation and Disappearance of the World’s First Time Machine, (Boca Raton: New Paradigm
Books, 2000). The story it tells is that a machine which could view and hear any scene from
the past was developed in the 1950s, by a team which eventually included Enrico Fermi,
following an accidental discovery with audio equipment made by Father Pellegrino Ernetti
and Father Agostino Gemelli on September 15th, 1952. Even if such a machine did exist
(which would mean that very advanced versions of it exist today), given that ‘chronovisor’
is not a household name, one should not expect all the details surrounding this story to
amount to a fully convincing case. Whether these alleged developments are part of the secret
history of technology or not, ‘chronovisor’ is a compelling and efficient term to use when
discussing the concept of non-line-of-sight past viewers. For interested readers who might
wish to cross-reference the information contained in Krassa’s book, two other book-length
works on the chronovisor story are also available: Teodorani, M., Il Cronovisore: Sogno del
futuro o esperimenti reali? (Diegaro di Cesena: Macro Edizioni, 2006). Brune, F., Das
Geheimnis des Pater Ernetti: Die Zeitmachine im Vatikan, (Saarbrücken: Hesper Verlag,
2010).
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time travel is also available. The case where a time traveler uses a chronovisor
to watch her own journey to the past which is also in her personal past is ob-
viously non-problematic. On the other hand, if a time traveler were to use a
chronovisor to view a journey she has yet to take, one might wonder whether
the chronovisor could potentially be forced into an interference viewing scenario.
Just as in the case of line-of-sight past viewers, view-travel unification also pre-
vents this possibility for chronovisors to the extent that a time traveler using
a properly designed and functioning chronovisor will only receive definite and
correct information about past events, even past events in which she has yet
to participate: A CTC will not open to allow any trip to the past inconsistent
with what has been, will, or could be chronovised.
This requirement forces non-contradiction, but at first it seems to reopen
the door to bilking. After using her chronovisor to view her upcoming time
trip, one might think that she now has an opportunity to go back in time and
choose to zig, even though she chronovised that she will go back and zag. Yet,
if she indeed zagged at that moment, being a time traveler, she knows that
the required CTC will not open for any trip which would have included an
offending zig. Since human psychology is such that it would be difficult to
entirely resist opportunities to test one’s degree of freedom, she may need to
agree to temporarily have the memories of that chronovisor session blocked so
that she will be able to open the CTC which will allow her to embark on the
corresponding trip. However, such a memory block would not be necessary if
she merely decides to do everything she chronovised. A case where she has
chronovised herself doing one thing on an upcoming time trip, but then chooses
to do something else, is impossible, because that would mean that there would
not have been such an upcoming trip to the past to chronovise in the first place.
This chronovisor scenario raises a topic with relevance to foreknowledge ma-
chines that has yet to be mentioned: Attempting to view one’s own future
actions would strongly tend to induce an interference viewing scenario. It is
likely that an organization which uses foreknowledge machines, chronovisors,
and time machines would discourage operators of foreknowledge machines and
chronovisors from attempting to view their own personal futures, especially
personal futures that are to occur in the past during time travel excursions,
since reception of such information in the later case could greatly complicate
the chances of opening the required CTCs. Rather than ever being exposed to
direct viewer foreknowledge of their own future actions, or chronovisor data of
upcoming time trips, field agents would typically receive dossiers which contain
just the information deemed necessary for their mission by operational support
specialists who have reviewed the relevant footage received by foreknowledge
machine or chronovisor operators.
Before moving on, it is necessary to deal with a few loose ends. Namely, it is
important to discuss how self-existing objects and instances of auto-generated
information may be dispelled.30 An insightful paper by Gustavo Romero and
30The following sources discuss or implicitly discuss self-existing objects, auto-generated
information, or both: Lewis, D., “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical
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Diego Torres presents the following example of the kind of situation in which
the possibility of a self-existing object has been imagined:
Suppose that... a time traveler takes a ride on a time machine
carrying a book with her. She goes back to the past, forgets the
book in... [what will be] her laboratory, and returns to the future.
The book remains then hidden until the time traveler finds it just
before starting her time trip, carrying the book with her.31
What a strange mystery such an object would be. “There is just a book never
created, never printed, but, somehow, existing in space-time.”32 The problem
of auto-generated information is more involved. Lloyd et al. refer to it using a
different name in the following example:
...P-CTCs provide a distinct resolution to Deutsch’s unproved
theorem paradox, in which the time traveler reveals the proof of a
theorem to a mathematician, who includes it in the same book from
which the traveler has learned it (rather, will learn it). How did this
proof come into existence?33
Quarterly, 13 (1976): 145-152. Editorial, “Analysis ‘Problem’ no. 18,” Analysis, 39 (1979):
65-66. Harrison, J., “Report on Analysis ‘Problem’ no. 18,” Analysis, 40 (1980): 65-69. Levin,
M. R., “Swords’ Points: [Analysis ‘Problem’ no. 18],” Analysis, 40 (1980): 69-70. Denruyter,
C., “Jocasta’s Crime: A Science Fiction Reply: [Analysis ‘Problem’ no. 18],” Analysis, 40
(1980): 71. Godfrey-Smith, W., “Travelling in Time: [Analysis ‘Problem’ no. 18],” Analysis,
40 (1980): 72-73. Nerlich, G., “Can Time Be Finite?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62
(1981): 227-239. MacBeath, M., “Who was Dr. Who’s Father?” Synthese, 51 (1982): 397-
430. Deutsch, D., “Quantum mechanics near closed timelike lines,” Physical Review D, 44
(1991): 3197-3217. Lossev, A., Novikov, I. D., “The Jinn of the time machine: non-trivial
self-consistent solutions,” Class. Quantum Grav., 9 (1992): 2309-2321. Visser, M., Lorentzian
Wormholes: From Einstein to Hawking, (New York: AIP Press, 1996). Smith, N. J. J.,
“Bananas Enough for Time Travel?” British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 48 (1997):
363-389. Gott, J. R., Li, L.-X., “Can the Universe Create Itself?” Physical Review D, 58 (1998):
023501. Romero, G. E., Torres, D. F., “Self-existing objects and auto-generated information
in chronology-violating space-times: A philosophical discussion,” Mod. Phys. Lett. A, 16
(2008): 1213-1222. Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y.,
Pirandola, S., Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed timelike
curves via postselection: theory and experimental demonstration,” arXiv :1005.2219v1 (2010):
5 pages. Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola,
S., Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed Timelike Curves
via Postselection: Theory and Experimental Test of Consistency,” Physical Review Letters,
106 (2011): 4 pages. Popular books also touch upon such topics. In particular, see Paul
Nahin’s indispensable time travel compendium. Nahin, P. J., Time Machines: Time Travel
in Physics, Metaphysics and Science Fiction (New York: Springer-Verlag and AIP Press,
1999).
31Romero, G. E., Torres, D. F., “Self-existing objects and auto-generated information in
chronology-violating space-times: A philosophical discussion,” Mod. Phys. Lett. A, 16 (2008):
1213-1222.
32Ibid.
33Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S.,
Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed Timelike Curves via
Postselection: Theory and Experimental Test of Consistency,” Physical Review Letters, 106
(2011): 4 pages.
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Both of these problems are dispelled in a relatively straightforward manner,
for similar reasons. As far as self-existing objects are concerned, here is the
standard way of explaining why they could not exist: All physical objects un-
dergo microscopic structural changes as they age, i.e., they accumulate “entropic
degradation.”34 When earlier states of an object have less degradation, and later
states have more, there is no problem—this even holds for an object sent through
a CTC, so that its more degraded states will end up taking place at an earlier cal-
endar date. However, in any would-be self-existing object, a reversal of entropic
degradation to allow a precise return to some target state is always required
to complete the loop without contradiction. Consider whether a human being
could be a self-existing object without an impossible age reversal somewhere
within the required life-loop, and the answer is clear. Such ineradicable con-
tradictions or impossibilities always lurk within all would-be self-existing object
situations.35 Of course, CTCs will only open in the absence of inconsistencies.
How appropriate that the puzzle of self-existing objects solves itself.
What about unproved theorems? A deeper analysis of why self-existing
objects are not possible provides insights which lead to understanding. What
prevents all the entropic degradation accumulated in the book on one leg of
an imagined object-loop from being gradually reversed as it heads back to any
given starting point, in order so that no discontinuity would be present? A
book consists of several trillion particles, all oscillating and jostling about on
different vectors. In the course of every second, a small percentage are naturally
dislodged by this activity from their previous positions, and some even leave the
book entirely. The book is never the same from moment to moment, on any
34Romero, G. E., Torres, D. F., “Self-existing objects and auto-generated information in
chronology-violating space-times: A philosophical discussion,” Mod. Phys. Lett. A, 16 (2008):
1213-1222.
35In 1992, physicists Andrei Lossev and Igor Novikov, who use the term ‘Jinnee’ to refer
to any individual self-existing object (pluralized as ‘Jinn’), made the following observation:
“Among macroscopic objects the only really good candidate to be a Jinnee that we have found
is the black hole. It seems that black holes cannot become older in a way that cannot be
reversed by giving them some energy.” While this interesting idea might sidestep the entropy
objection, it does not open the conceptual way for self-existing objects. This follows for an
astonishingly simple reason. Any collaboration to support the actualization of a self-existing
object, by adding just the right amount of energy to a black hole at just the right time, must
consist of at least two stages. To favor black hole Jinn as much as possible, assume a very large
permanent natural wormhole in deep space, with mouths that are relatively close, separated
by only a few light-seconds. Assume also that any object which enters the wormhole’s future
mouth will come out of its past mouth a month earlier. In the first stage of such an effort, a
team must wait for the black hole in question to emerge from the past mouth of the wormhole,
in order to immediately measure its energy content. The second stage would involve adding
precisely the required amount of energy to the same black hole, using data from the first stage,
and getting it to enter the future mouth of the wormhole. But, there is already a problem with
this story. The first stage cannot begin until time α, defined as one month before the second
stage will be completed, since the black hole cannot emerge from the past mouth any earlier
than a month before it enters the future mouth. However, the second stage also could not
commence until after time α, as this would be the earliest opportunity for anyone to see the
supposed black hole and begin working on it. From these two conditions, it is clear that time
α could never arrive. Lossev, A., Novikov, I. D., “The Jinn of the time machine: non-trivial
self-consistent solutions,” Class. Quantum Grav., 9 (1992): 2309-2321.
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physically-relevant timescale. In order to return the book to any previous state,
a tremendous amount of information about that state would have to have been
instantly cataloged. Complete knowledge about where each particle had been
would be needed. Then, of course, some way of returning each book particle
to its original position, and removing all the particles that had settled into the
book from the environment, would have to be devised. Imagine for a moment
that all these feats could be achieved. Would that do it? Even after all that
work, it turns out that such a process would not get the book anywhere close
to the way it had been. This is because each particle (i.e., atom or molecule)
would also have to be given the exact amount of kinetic energy that it had had
in the target configuration, on exactly the same vector, and all their internal
quantum states would also have to perfectly match. These requirements enor-
mously increase the already astronomical amount of information that would be
required. Setting aside all the insurmountable feasibility considerations with
respect to how particles might be returned, removed, accelerated, decelerated,
and internally quantum-matched in order to achieve the target state, the prob-
lem of restoring the book is really an information problem. So, there is no
wonder that there must be a discontinuity of information within any imagined
self-existing object. Now, cases of would-be unproved theorems would also in-
volve a discontinuity of information, but the amount of information would be
several orders of magnitude less. One difference that might be noted is that any
case of auto-generated information would constitute a discontinuity of informa-
tion in the universe as a whole, rather than within an imagined object-loop. Of
course, an imagined object-loop, if it could exist, would have to be part of the
universe, so on another level of analysis there is ultimately no difference.
Now, from a more general perspective, the grandfather paradox is also ruled
out because bilking would lead to a discontinuity of information within the
universe as a whole. So, that which rules out the grandfather paradox is another
consequence of the mechanism which rules out unproved theorems: No CTC will
ever open that would lead, even accidentally, to a discontinuity of information.
These findings are consistent with the manner in which cases of auto-generated
information have been mathematically dispelled by Lloyd et al., insofar as their
applicable P-CTC circuit delivers, “a random mixture of all possible ‘proofs,’ ”36
“The circuit is unbiased as to the value of the ‘proof’ bit, so it automatically
assigns that bit a completely mixed value.”37 The logic of what their schematic
model indicates is clear. All possible “proofs” taken together must be maximally
ambiguous with respect to any specific proof, so their model manages to mathe-
matically communicate that no information can be created within an “unproved
theorem paradox circuit.”38
36Lloyd, S., Maccone, L., Garcia-Patron, R., Giovannetti, V., Shikano, Y., Pirandola, S.,
Rozema, L., Darabi, A., Soudagar, Y., Shalm, L., Steinberg, A., “Closed Timelike Curves via
Postselection: Theory and Experimental Test of Consistency,” Physical Review Letters, 106
(2011): 4 pages. In this quotation, the word ‘proofs’ is in quotes to indicate that all possible
proofs must consist of “proofs” that are merely gibberish, i.e., strings which are not proofs at
all.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
24
An interesting implication of the impossibility of cases of auto-generated
information is that it effectively sandboxes different time periods from one an-
other, to some degree, insulating the vast majority of people in earlier periods
from information about the innovations and inventions of later periods. This
would hold even in a world where foreknowledge machines and pastward time
travel have been used for centuries. This is because the impossibility of auto-
generated information means that it is physically impossible to provide either
an author who originates a given set of conceptual innovations, or the original
inventor of a given technology, with those very innovations or inventions. Of
course, this is because anyone who might try to supply such things to such
an author or inventor must have gotten such information from that author or
inventor. Now, it would certainly be possible for foreknowledge machine oper-
ators and time travelers to gain or bring back information from the future, but
there is no way for anyone with access to such information to tell a given author
or inventor whose work they have learned about in their studies of the future,
anything specific about what he or she will do. The most they could arrange
would be to vaguely but powerfully encourage and inspire him throughout his
life, on occasion, since childhood.
6 Matched Pairs in the Future-Making Process
The postselected, self-adjusting, cyclical, self-consistent model which supports
view-travel unification has a very important feature: Cyclical matching guaran-
tees that any instance of viewer foreknowledge must match the future outcome
it reveals, in every detail. It is therefore appropriate to conceive of any such
instance, together with its associated outcome, as a matched pair.
A good way to explain the mechanism at work in this cyclical matching
process involves an important result of quantum mechanics that was masterfully
presented in a lecture, quoted below, by the great physicist Richard Feynman.
David Pegg discusses this result in his 2005 article, “Quantum Mechanics and
the Time Travel Paradox”:
It is not totally surprising that a principle applying to classical
physics has a quantum mechanical basis. The classical principle of
least action can be explained in terms of the addition of amplitudes
associated with the possible paths. The amplitudes for all paths
except for those in the region of the path of least action cancel, so
the probability for finding that the system has taken a path not
near the path of least action is zero. This explains how the system
“knows” to take the path of least action.39
With respect to the generation of viewer foreknowledge from foreknowledge
machines, the least action problem that nature would have to work out would
be enormously complex, for it would necessarily involve wavefunction amplitude
39Pegg, D. “Quantum Mechanics and the Time Travel Paradox,” arXiv :quant-ph/0506141
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addition (and so, effectively, subtraction) throughout all intervening physical
situations leading to the outcome displayed. To gain more insight into what
this means in the current context, consider what Pegg wrote next:
In this paper we suggest that closed causal cycles are sorted out
by a similar mechanism. Only those cycles with a net non-zero
amplitude have a non-zero probability of occurring and these are
the consistent cycles.40
Note that the approach Pegg advocated in 2005 is perfectly consistent with the
more fleshed-out work of Lloyd et al., and that it has application here due to
view-travel unification. A given cycle in the case of foreknowledge machines
begins with viewer foreknowledge of an outcome, continues through all the
foreknowledge-informed actions and preparations, culminates in the outcome,
and loops back to end where it began with the reception of viewer foreknowl-
edge. On each end of the cycle is a member of the matched pair in question,
so as soon as any viewer foreknowledge is received, such a “closed causal cycle”
must have been “sorted out.” This is the future-making process employed by
groups who use foreknowledge machine technology. Solution of a massive appli-
cable least action problem, would serve to explain how the outcome and, if also
future-viewed, all of the intervening preparatory outcomes, would crystallize as
viewer foreknowledge. Feynman gave an important lecture more than fifty years
ago which provides deep insight into understanding this process:
Is it true that the particle doesn’t just ‘take the right path’ but
that it looks at all the other possible trajectories? And if by having
things in the way, we don’t let it look, that we will get an analog
of diffraction? The miracle of it all is, of course, that it does just
that. That’s what the laws of quantum mechanics say. It isn’t that a
particle takes the path of least action but that it smells all the paths
in the neighborhood and chooses the one that has the least action by
a method analogous to the one by which light chose the shortest time.
You remember that the way light chose the shortest time was this:
If it went on a path that took a different amount of time, it would
arrive at a different phase. And the total amplitude at some point
is the sum of contributions of amplitude for all the different ways
light can arrive. All the paths that give wildly different phases don’t
add up to anything. But if you can find a whole sequence of paths
which have phases almost all the same, then the little contributions
will add up and you get a reasonable total amplitude to arrive. The
important path becomes the one for which there are many nearby
paths which give the same phase.41
His words reveal many key concepts of robust application here. Although Feyn-
man referred to a particle taking a path, the kind of least action problem that
40Ibid.
41Feynman, R., The Feynman Lectures on Physics, (Palo Alto: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1964).
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nature would solve in cases of significant viewer foreknowledge would always
involve vast collections of particles. Of course, everything he said about single
particles would apply to any number of them.
It is highly relevant in this context to discuss the double-slit experiment.
In the double-slit experiment, it is important to note that the characteristic
interference pattern will still emerge even if photons are only introduced into
the experimental apparatus one at a time. This is because the pattern built
up over time is the result of the interference of probability amplitudes within
the wavefunction. In single-photon cases, due to diffraction of the wavefunction
at the slits, the least action problem for each photon path may be solved by
any solution among a class of solutions, i.e., any solution which corresponds to
detection locations of non-zero probability under the applicable wavefunction.
So, each run of a single-photon double-slit experiment involves a stochastic
quantum mechanical forking event which leads to one out of all the potential
photon detection location outcomes. This raises an interesting and important
question: What would happen if one were to use a foreknowledge machine in
order to gaze upon a single-photon double-slit experiment to be performed in
the future? Setting interference viewing scenarios aside, as they are a separate
consideration, it will be shown that a foreknowledge machine would deliver
viewer foreknowledge which details the precise location of each future photon
detection outcome.
How could precise viewer foreknowledge of photon detection locations in
future experimental runs be conceivable, if the single-photon double-slit experi-
ment always involves a quantum mechanical forking event that can never be ex-
pected to produce precisely the same photon detection location from run to run?
The answer comes from the cyclical matching viewpoint of viewer foreknowledge.
While any number of final detection locations on the photographic plate or CCD
are indeed possible within any given run of a single-photon double-slit experi-
ment, the case of attaining viewer foreknowledge of an upcoming single-photon
double-slit experiment is specially constrained. Namely, cyclical matching en-
sures that the detection location revealed in viewer foreknowledge of a given
future experimental run will not differ from that which will occur during the
experimental run itself. Viewer foreknowledge emerges only from a process of
cyclical matching which will always produce a matched foreknowledge-outcome
pair within a given closed causal cycle, and for this reason it confers certainty.
Although quantum mechanics allows for many apparently inherently unpre-
dictable possibilities, cyclical matching readily explains how viewer foreknowl-
edge will never err, even regarding outcomes that are the result of long and
enormously complex sequences of quantum mechanical forkings.
7 Further Details and Implications
The above analysis serves to integrate future viewing with time travel. This
integration helps to further assure us that neither technology could destroy the
mutual agreement of events in time, or be used to cause any sort of a paradox
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(Lloyd et al. and others having already established this in the case of time
travel). It has also been shown that no contradiction or loopy absurdity could
arise, even if foreknowledge machines, Everett machines, chronovisors, line-of-
sight past viewers, spaceships, and time machines were all freely used together.42
Additionally, the limitations and properties of any outcome-informative future-
viewing technology have been clarified. Most importantly, it has been shown
exactly why outcome-informative future viewers could only present viewer fore-
knowledge, i.e., definite and correct information about future outcomes, within
non-interference viewing scenarios.
If time machines and foreknowledge machines exist, or are ever invented
in a non-academic setting, many societal and geopolitical reasons justify why
they have remained, or could be expected to remain, secret for decades. In
this regard, any group possessing such technology would have an ace up its
collective sleeve; they would be able to know with certainty that the existence
of foreknowledge machines will be kept secret—for as long as it is foreseen that
they will be kept secret—and that any outcomes which have been witnessed
in viewer foreknowledge will not be divulged to any party that will prevent
them. Every aspect of operational security could always be confirmed via viewer
foreknowledge itself.
This seemingly magical ability emerges from the realization that as soon as
an operator would “dial in” a future spacetime coordinate and receive viewer
foreknowledge of a given outcome, all the events leading to that outcome, if
then viewed, would also be received as viewer foreknowledge. Foreknowledge
machines will always detect interference viewing scenarios by supplying only
ambiguous information, or failing to operate altogether. The chances of false
viewer foreknowledge could thus be entirely eliminated through sufficient oper-
ator protocols and redundancy. Now, once any foreknowledge machine provides
viewer foreknowledge of a given outcome, all foreknowledge machines free of
interference will deliver identical viewer foreknowledge of it.
One implication of this is that individuals within groups who have learned
of a given future outcome in the form of viewer foreknowledge could try to
prevent the outcome all they want, but ultimately they would either decide to
42However, one major conundrum has yet to be addressed. Earman’s rocket is a famous
philosophical time travel puzzle, proposed by the philosopher John Earman in 1972, which
once appeared to be unsolvable without resorting to coincidental malfunctions or timeline
bifurcation. Earman’s rocket is programmed to launch its probe back in time if it does not
detect its probe earlier, but it will not launch its probe if it does detect it—the classic “it
doesn’t if it does, and does if it doesn’t” conundrum. The answer in the context of the work of
Lloyd et al. is simple: In cases of probe non-detection, the rocket’s attempts to open a CTC in
order to launch its probe will always fail, not due to a coincidental malfunction, but due to the
proper functioning of the laws of physics associated with CTCs. The case of probe detection
is even easier: If Earman’s rocket is functioning as designed, it will never detect its own probe
earlier, since it could not ever open a CTC. Only a malfunction which effectively reverses its
programmed behavior could allow it to open a CTC. An extension of Earman’s rocket puzzle,
advanced by Jenann Ismael, is addressed in a similar manner. Earman, J., “Implications of
Causal Propagation Outside the Null-Cone,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50 (1972):
222-237. Ismael, J., “Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument,” Synthese, 136 (2003):
305-320.
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stop trying or they would fail, just as viewer foreknowledge also would have
shown. As will be established in the next paragraph, once viewer foreknowledge
which details a given outcome has been received by a foreknowledge machine, all
efforts to prevent that outcome based on such information will be unsuccessful.
The original pointer position experiment may be modified to demonstrate
this. Imagine that the experimental protocol were to allow two programs to
be run sequentially at tB. In this modified setup, the first of these programs
can be any of the interfering programs, P-1 through P-359, and the second
program will be P-0. In this modified experiment, no matter which interfering
program runs first, the tA-stationed viewer will display viewer foreknowledge
of the tC pointer position, due to the adjustments carried out by P-0 before
the computer halts. In this modified setup, the first program represents an
unsuccessful effort to interfere with the outcome which the tA-stationed viewer
was able to receive as viewer foreknowledge, due to the corrective action of P-0.
Now, consider what would have been observed if this corrective program had not
been present. In such a case, the experiment would be in its original form, so
viewer foreknowledge of the tC pointer position would not have been accessible
to the tA-stationed viewer. Therefore, receiving viewer foreknowledge about a
future outcome with a foreknowledge machine means that such foreknowledge
will not be used to prevent the outcome.
This confirms that, “once viewer foreknowledge which details a given out-
come has been received by a foreknowledge machine, all efforts to prevent that
outcome based on such information will be unsuccessful.” Furthermore, since
people who are not aware of such information would probably not be aware of
the pending outcome, one may automatically conclude that nearly all efforts to
prevent the outcome will be unsuccessful. Any other efforts to prevent the out-
come could only occur to parties who have somehow uncovered clues, strictly
unrelated to future viewing, which suggest that such an event will probably
happen, or might happen. However, if any party without the benefit of viewer
foreknowledge were to succeed in preventing the outcome received as viewer
foreknowledge, then whatever would have taken place instead of the prevented
outcome would have been what the foreknowledge machine would have received
in the first place. So it may be concluded that no party, whether aware or un-
aware of viewer foreknowledge pertaining to a given outcome, can possibly be
successful in preventing that outcome. Viewer foreknowledge cannot be used to
try to prevent the outcomes it reveals; viewer foreknowledge is inviolable.
However, the opposite transition is available: Ambiguous information from
a foreknowledge machine (or no information at all), pertaining to what will
take place at a given future spacetime coordinate, can always be replaced by
viewer foreknowledge under another viewing scenario which will become acces-
sible when the context changes.
In order to provide an example of a transition from an interference viewing
scenario to a non-interference viewing scenario, consider the original pointer po-
sition experiment carried out during runs of interference programs P-1 through
P-359: At tA, a future-viewing of the tC pointer position will, at most, yield
only ambiguous information. The computer will execute an interfering program
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at tB and it will halt strictly before three seconds have elapsed. Now, let ‘tB+3’
specify the time coordinate three seconds after tB. It is clear that, were an ef-
fort made at tB+3 to future-view the tC pointer position, viewer foreknowledge
would result. This is because a non-interference viewing scenario exists by tB+3,
for the computer has halted.
So, viewer foreknowledge will always become accessible to a foreknowledge
machine when the context changes, but must the context always change? Yes;
at least during the very last moment before an outcome occurs, an interfer-
ence viewing scenario with respect to that outcome cannot exist. Consider the
most extreme case: One Planck time (approximately 5.4  10-43 seconds) before a
given outcome occurs, there is literally no physically meaningful amount of time
remaining to allow any system to process or act upon any future-viewed infor-
mation about that outcome. At such a late stage it clearly would be impossible
for future-viewed information about an outcome to be used to interfere with it.
Of course, while this means that a transition between ambiguous and definite
information must always occur before every outcome, in such an exaggerated
case, the operator would only see and understand the output of the foreknowl-
edge machine well after the corresponding event has already occurred. So, the
real value of this demonstration of concept is to confirm that future viewing is
consistent with past viewing in general—which always operates within a non-
interference viewing scenario—since every possible interference viewing scenario
with respect to a given future outcome must disappear before that outcome be-
comes an element of the past.
As mentioned above, it is also the case that a separate foreknowledge machine
which is not connected to the computer in control of the pointer will always
receive viewer foreknowledge. Only the viewer involved in the experiment will
be hindered. Closely related to this, it is somewhat ironic that only those who
will not (including those who cannot43) act upon viewer foreknowledge will
remain in a non-interference viewing scenario, and thereby continue to have
uninterrupted viewer foreknowledge of nearly all outcomes. However, even an
ostensibly inert operator cannot gain viewer foreknowledge about all outcomes:
Since it is impossible for anyone to not act, due to the fact that any effort to
avoid acting is itself an action, an operator who attempts to view her own future
actions will tend to place herself in an interference viewing scenario.
A great deal of this work has been devoted to the issue of interference viewing
scenarios, but an important question about them has not yet been addressed.
Would a group possessing foreknowledge machines ever encounter interference
viewing scenarios with respect to world outcomes? While it has been shown
that interference viewing scenarios could be arranged in a laboratory, could
they ever arise when foreknowledge machines are applied to understanding fu-
ture historical events? In the laboratory, interference viewing scenarios arise
when no instance of definite and correct information about a given outcome,
i.e., no instance of viewer foreknowledge, is possible. Again, this would occur
43In Agammenon, Apollo’s edict effectively puts Cassandra in a non-interference viewing
scenario with respect to any future outcome too big for her to prevent alone.
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in situations where any example of definite information would necessarily be
incorrect, which would force a foreknowledge machine to provide either ambigu-
ous information, or none at all. It is difficult to imagine an interference viewing
scenario in the case of a future historical event, for this would mean that no
instance of viewer foreknowledge pertaining to that event could be consistent
with its details. Instead, a case that has already been mentioned would happen
frequently, wherein a future historical event which has been received in viewer
foreknowledge is engineered by groups with foreknowledge machines—a special
and important kind of non-interference viewing scenario. The rest of the paper
will be about foreknowledge machines and world outcomes.
The following issue in this context is critical in the conceptual exploration
of foreknowledge machines: What prevents foreknowledge machines from ever
becoming the nightmarish contraptions that Cassandra machines would be, if
Cassandra machines were possible? The answer to this question emerges from
the cyclical basis of view-travel unification. Remember, “cyclical matching guar-
antees that any instance of viewer foreknowledge must match the future outcome
it reveals, in every detail.” Once an instance of viewer foreknowledge is obtained,
one does not simply discover what the future will be, the way one might dis-
cover the activities of microbes by peering into a microscope. Instead, every
relevant future action (leading to the future-viewed outcome) of every individ-
ual who watches, will watch, or will be briefed on a given instance of viewer
foreknowledge, and the actions of everyone who will receive commands or will
be subtly guided on its basis, must automatically and instantly factor into the
formation of the matched pair in question. It would be amazing to witness, that
although this future-making process always plays out over the entire cycle in
question (which might span years, decades, or even centuries), its full and final
results would always necessarily coincide with the reception of viewer foreknowl-
edge. One can conceive of viewer foreknowledge and its paired future outcome
as emerging together from a complex, behaviorally and thus mentally influenced
optimization process within the corresponding closed causal cycle. The result
is necessarily a perfect match, optimized with respect to every aspect of the
arena in which all the preparatory and culminating events will transpire, an
arena which especially includes behavioral responses which emerge from a great
deal of thought, due to the fact that viewer foreknowledge has been received
(by as many parties, using as many foreknowledge machines, as many times
as apply), over the entire cycle in question. So, the cognitive processing of all
actors, who will be affected by and who will affect any aspect of the pair, must
necessarily be fully integrated into the process. Now also, if a given instance
of viewer foreknowledge reveals events that will occur independently of the re-
ception of viewer foreknowledge, then the future cognitive processing of actors
who are completely unaware of foreknowledge machines will be factored into the
formation of the corresponding matched pair.
A unique future emerges from this complex interplay; it is the one future
which corresponds perfectly with all the details of how it was generated in the
cooperative future-making process which in many cases, as a matter of logical
necessity, cannot be divorced from the fact that viewer foreknowledge of that
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very future has been received. It would always be a custom-fit future we make
for ourselves with willing hands. So, it should be clear that foreknowledge
machines, whether they already exist or have yet to be technologically realized,
are not to be feared.
Given all of the amazing properties of foreknowledge machines, any group
which possesses them could be expected to go to great lengths, both to conceal
the existence of the underlying technology and to regulate the flow of viewer
foreknowledge. After all, if knowledge is power, what does that make viewer
foreknowledge? Of course, as has already been mentioned, foreknowledge ma-
chines would guarantee that any given fact will remain secret for precisely as
long as the relevant viewer foreknowledge shows that it will remain secret. Any
day of reckoning would be foreseen, and thus fully planned for, well in advance.
While any group with foreknowledge machines would have a powerful in-
fluence upon future events, for reasons already explained, having a powerful
influence over what will happen and deciding what will happen are two dif-
ferent things. Such a group would quickly come to realize that even with all
the potent technology at their disposal, they still would not be in a position to
decide what the future will be. They would see that it is not them, but rather
the quantum workings of nature within the world situation, a world situation
that now very influentially includes foreknowledge machines, which is ultimately
determining the course of history. This follows for a few interrelated reasons.
First of all, they could not ever cause outcomes contrary to any instance of
viewer foreknowledge, so whatever they find on their screens is precisely what
they and the rest of the world will end up experiencing. Furthermore, it is likely
that nearly every instance of viewer foreknowledge pertaining to any historically
significant event they might receive would involve outcomes they did not plan
in any traditional sense, for how could they know details about the future other
than through viewer foreknowledge, communication with cooperative future-
dwellers, or by traveling to the future and returning with information? Since
all of these methods respect the second-time-around fallacy, as soon as they
might come to find out what the future holds, they could not act in any way
to alter it. Obviously, then, any future outcomes such a group could become
acquainted with through viewer foreknowledge, or by any other means, would
not have been conceived by them or planned by them in any traditional sense,
even though their resultant actions, which would have to include a great deal of
planning, could indeed turn out to be instrumental in the fruition of such out-
comes. While all observations so far have hypothetically assumed just one secret
group with foreknowledge machines, they would all still apply if several secret
groups were to independently invent them. This is because the inviolability
of viewer foreknowledge would necessarily unite groups who use foreknowledge
machines, such that they can always be considered to act in concert; they would
all necessarily and willingly move toward the same outcomes together.
Realize also that a group with foreknowledge machines could not choose
to stop using them if their screens continue to deliver viewer foreknowledge
that they will continue to use them. In a sense, any group which begins to
use foreknowledge machines and other related technologies has embarked on a
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course of action from which they cannot arbitrarily choose to diverge. While
they might have imagined at the outset that such advanced technologies would
help them further their own agenda, within a few months it would dawn upon
them that what has effectively become their agenda has been and will continue
to be given to them by the overall process which generates viewer foreknowledge,
and also, that there is nothing they can do about it.
How could the laws of nature, calculating within ever-lengthening viewer
foreknowledge cycles, have an agenda? This is really the wrong question. Think
about it this way: Do the laws of nature have an agenda to make rubber ducks
float in bathtubs? No, of course not; rubber ducks float in bathtubs due to
the properties of rubber ducks, bathtubs, liquid water, and strong gravitational
fields. Whenever these elements are brought together in the relevant way, rubber
ducks will float. The same kind of explanatory understanding must also apply
to whatever seeming agenda the laws of nature would appear to hand down to
such groups through cyclical matching within the world situation.
Can efforts to arrive at an explanatory understanding of how the laws of
nature could seem to manifest an agenda when technologically funneled into the
production of viewer foreknowledge, give any hint as to what the ultimate “goal”
of such an apparent agenda might be? Think about a rubber duck introduced
under water, at the bottom of a bathtub. In a strong gravitational field, this
represents an imbalance of density distribution that naturally produces a force
which will act to make the duck rise to the surface, since water, which is of
greater density than the average density of the hollow duck, will fill in beneath
it until a balance of density distribution has been restored. Once there is no more
water above the duck to fill in beneath it, the duck will be resting on the water’s
surface in a state of equilibrium. Now, the initial discovery and perfection of
future-viewing technology, which would certainly be carried out in secret, could
also represent the introduction of an imbalance capable of producing a force
which would bring about some final state. As one ponders these issues, an
idea about what this final state might be becomes increasingly clear. There
are strong reasons for believing that this final state can be none other than the
introduction of foreknowledge machines to the world.
Surely, if only one or a handful of groups were to possess foreknowledge
machines, rather than the whole of humanity, such a condition would represent
an imbalance, a non-equilibrium state. This is because a great deal of work
would have to be done in order to keep foreknowledge machines and viewer
foreknowledge secret. Such work can be likened to a hand holding a rubber
duck under water, to prevent it from reaching the natural equilibrium state of
floating on the water’s surface. Now, a person could choose to hold a rubber
duck under water for a long time, since she solely decides what to do with
her hands. However, as already established, what the “hands” of individuals
in groups with foreknowledge machines will ultimately do is, in some sense,
not fully up to them. Remember, they do not decide all on their own what
their agenda will be; they have willingly given this up in favor of something
greater. Their agenda is “decided” by the physics of their unique technological
position. The process behind viewer foreknowledge continually informs them of
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what they, as a whole, will choose to do willingly, and they must defer to its
inherent wisdom—the wisdom of their own future thoughts and actions in light
of viewer foreknowledge—to discover what their direction will become. So, it is
certainly conceivable, and even highly likely, that the relevant equilibrium state
in this context, i.e., the introduction of foreknowledge machines to the world,
might eventually become their goal.
So, no matter how secretive in origin, groups with foreknowledge machines
eventually would probably not wish to permanently keep the technology all to
themselves. In any case, of course, they would be aware of the physical impos-
sibility of preventing any given future that they might find in viewer foreknowl-
edge. In all likelihood, they would foresee something like one of the following
sets of future outcomes: Either they would find that they will eventually reveal
foreknowledge machines (and possibly time machines) to the world themselves,
or that they will subtly or secretly help others to “discover” such technologies,
or that they will simply not interfere with an eventual independent rediscov-
ery of foreknowledge machines and their subsequent worldwide proliferation.
One may conclude that groups which have developed such technologies would
witness something like one of these outcomes in viewer foreknowledge, to an
overwhelming degree of likelihood, since the only alternative would correspond
to the future-making process “deciding” to keep foreknowledge machines and
viewer foreknowledge a cloistered secret permanently. Such an outcome would
be almost as unlikely as a rubber duck remaining underwater forever. In the
end, however the grand breakthrough might occur, the acknowledgement and
demonstration of foreknowledge machine technology would surely be an event to
be counted among the most significant developments in human history, alongside
the invention of writing, the adoption of farming, and the discovery of fire.
Once foreknowledge machines would be revealed (or are revealed), the pro-
cess of their integration into the conduct of civilization as a whole would (or
will) begin in earnest. Interestingly, the machines themselves, in a manage-
able, step-by-step fashion, would show us how this amazing revolution is to be
accomplished. Also, the slow but sure process of coming to terms with and
understanding all the cruel actions that were taken prior to the unveiling of
foreknowledge machines could get underway. Many of the historically signif-
icant events that foreknowledge machine groups might foresee in the decades
prior to the introduction of foreknowledge machines to the world, would seem
senselessly cruel outside of the paradigm of viewer foreknowledge. However, once
everyone has been inducted into this paradigm, we would begin to understand
that such events were not planned by them in any traditional sense, for they
could not have been altered once they were received as viewer foreknowledge.
The world as a whole would begin to understand and accept that, no matter
how cruel, such events had been part of a necessary stage in the progression
which led to the end result, a world resting in equilibrium, united permanently
through viewer foreknowledge. The people of such a world would eventually
agree that the foreknowledge machine groups of the past had no choice other
than to do what they did. The bright side of all this is that there is a sense
in which the cruelty of an era of secret viewer foreknowledge would necessarily
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vanish in an era of public viewer foreknowledge. A world wherein an entire
civilization benefits from viewer foreknowledge of large-scale outcomes would
obviously be drastically different, and much better for everyone involved, than
the transitional world involving secret foreknowledge machine groups before it.
It is up to us all, the whole of humanity, to dream of such a world, to dream of
what we might create together.
Might achieving such an equilibrium state be the final piece of a cosmic
puzzle that all civilizations must place, essentially on their own, in order to
qualify for integration with other civilizations in the universe? If foreknowledge
machine technology is possible, imagine the peace other civilizations know, a
peace of certainty which naturally emerges through shared equilibrium with
other intelligent species who have achieved the same lofty status throughout
space and time. Maybe foreknowledge machines and realistic time machines
are nothing more than compelling and logically interrelated fictions. However,
maybe these technologies are achievable, or have already been achieved, and are
destined to form the very basis of our future.
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